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The Market for Person-controlled Personal Data with the Hub-of-all-Things 
(HAT) 
 
 
Irene CL Ng 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper theorises personal data more fundamentally and exposes the 
vulnerability of organisation-controlled personal data. It then reports on the micro-
economic model design of a new personal data exchange by designing and creating 
PPD or person-controlled personal data through a new technological artefact called 
the Hub-of-all-Things (HAT) and report the build and implementation of the 
mechanisms, coordination and incentive structures for PPD exchanges. 
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Introduction 
 
Data Data is an institutional artefact. It is a symbol and a visual cue, making sense 
only because of our beliefs. Early institutional economists consider such beliefs as 
an institutionalised logic, a form of social structure that shapes behaviours, 
purposes or preferences (Commons 1931). I can conceive the ‘first’ data to be 
scratches on a cave wall, markings to denote the height of a child. If one did not 
know it was there for this purpose, it would just be scratches on the wall. However, 
by the nature of the way the scratches are systematically carved, I believe they 
could be height markings. Hence, I rely on the institutions I have crafted to make 
sense of the scratches. 
 
When data becomes digital, it is encoded as a bitstring, a sequence of binary digits, 
0s and 1s (Quah 2003). Economists have studied bitstrings as digital goods (Quah 
2003; Belleflamme 2016) or information goods beginning from Shapiro and Varian’s 
(1998) treatise that anything that can be digitised is an information or digital good 
in the economy. To make sense of such bitstrings, certain assumptions are made; 
chief amongst them is that the bitstring is valuable i.e. it affects the payoff to some 
actor in the economy, which is why it was created in the first place. 
 
This paper builds upon work on digital goods, first by theorising the economic 
properties of personal data and its derivative, its inferential signals that are of value 
to firms in the market. From there, I expose the vulnerabilities of personal data in 
control of firms and the market failure of perishable signals, signals generated by 
personal data that expire quickly. I then present a redesign of the market for 
personal data through the creation of a new asset; person-controlled personal data 
(PPD), a new asset class arising from individual ownership of a personal micro-
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server that bestows intellectual property rights over the personal data within it. I 
elaborate on the microeconomic design and build - the asset, the coordination 
structure and the market design for PPD. Finally, I report the findings from the 
market implementation. 
 
 
Personal Data as an Information Good 
 
Personal data is generated from the consumption of goods and services. For 
example, interacting on social media generates posts; using Google Calendar 
creates entries. Even consuming physical goods generates personal data, from 
wearing a Fitbit to using an Internet-connected coffee machine. The bitstring data 
collected is usually stored within software applications and forms the asset of the 
firm that owns the app and the technology. Such personal data may not be 
released by the firms that own it, but should the firm transfer it on, it reaches the 
market in two ways. 
 
The conventional route is its release to data brokers. This release is sometimes 
combined with de-identification, e.g. scrubbing personal identity information from 
the rest of the data, replacing it with a generic ID, especially in parts of the world 
with strong data protection and privacy laws. Since the advent of ICT, consumer 
data in the form of supermarket spending and banking transactions have been 
collected, analysed and often transferred to third parties and re-combined with 
other data. Often, the anonymised data is “re-identified” so as to draw insights that 
help brands plan their consumer strategies. Re-identification is the practice of 
matching de-identified data with other datasets in order to discover the individual 
to whom the data belongs.  It is through this process that firms have been able to 
target their offerings to the consumer segment most likely to purchase their 
products. Such consumer data link actual behaviours gleaned from disparate 
datasets to predict future buying and usage behaviours and sell on the insights to 
firms. 
 
The advancement of Internet technology has resulted in a new channel for 
transferring personal data; a set of clearly-defined standards of communication 
between software components (whatever software language they are written in), 
called Application Protocol Interfaces (APIs). APIs are now one of the most common 
ways technology companies integrate with one other. An example would be the 
sharing of Spotify (music streaming) data with Sonos (speaker) resulting in 
individuals being able to play their own Spotify playlists on Sonos speakers. Sharing 
personal data in this manner results in contracts between firms for data usage, with 
the user’s consent, and moves data from being a resource within ICT systems to 
becoming an information/digital good provided by a source firm as an input factor 
to the destination firm. The mutual sharing of personal data between applications 
with the consent of the individual achieves pareto-efficient outcomes since 
individuals benefit from re-using data that is locked-up within other applications, 
and all firms benefit from more data at low marginal costs. This liberation of 
personal data from firms to become a real-time, on-demand and dynamically-
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updated information good is creating network effects but require new ways of 
conceptualising information goods in economics. 
 
Take, for example, a person relaxing at the end of the day by making a cocktail, 
searching for the recipe online and then listening to music on Spotify while drinking 
the cocktail. While searching for the recipe is a consumption of a digital good (a 
browser), generating the data when searching or while listening to music is an 
informational resource to aid the improvement of Google and Spotify, similar to 
data generated by a car engine informing its future design and production, 
regardless of who drives it (Loebbecke 2002). Yet, that data is evidence of actual 
human behaviour, much like scanner data at supermarkets or transaction data in 
banks. When liberated, it contributes to the existing market for consumer data. 
Similarly, physical things with sensors becoming Internet-Connected-Objects (ICO) 
are starting to generate petabytes of data from room temperature, train arrival 
locations, doors or windows opened (Ng and Wakenshaw 2017). The creation of 
sensor data from human interactions is exploding the supply of personal data as an 
information good. This is especially so when personal data held in walled siloes of 
applications would generate higher payoffs when combined with other datasets 
(see Ng et al. 2015). The large amount of data generated and available for 
recombination has created the challenge of ‘big data’, described as data with 
‘volume, variety and velocity’ (TechAmerica Foundation’s Federal Big Data 
Commission 2012; Gandomi and Haider 2015; De Mauro, Greco, and Grimaldi 
2016). The big data movement often studies three overarching issues: (1) 
technology problems, ie. collecting, storing and analysing the large volume of data; 
(2) commercial value ie. insights from data; and (3) societal impacts of big data, ie. 
privacy, regulations for commercial use of this data (Nunan and Di Domenico 2013). 
Whether legal or not,  personal data now accounts for 36% of data-brokering 
activities globally (Transparency Market Research 2017). When personal data 
becomes liberated by the firm through connectivity or re-selling, a secondary 
market emerges due to its potential benefit as an asset, particularly to advertisers 
and manufacturers, since it can be used to generate consumer insights albeit at 
some societal cost in terms of privacy loss (Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman 2016). 
Leading companies operating in the global data broker market include Acxiom 
Corporation, Experian Plc, Equifax, Inc. Within these markets, data brokers 
aggregate and analyse consumers’ data to make inferences about them. 
 
There is evidence that despite the high transaction costs and risks in holding 
personal data, re-identification of data through the connection of disparate 
datasets finds an efficient market. Thus, even if anonymisation and aggregation 
may destroy the original structure of the bitstring dataset, necessary to comply 
with some regulatory authorities like Europe, a market emerges to reconstitute it. 
Indeed, as a Federal Trade Commission study1 has revealed, data brokers collect 
personal data from many resources largely without consumers’ knowledge and re-
                                               
1 Ramirez, Edith, Julie Brill, Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Joshua Wright, Terrell McSweeny, (2014) Data Brokers: A call for 
transaprency and accountability, Federal Trade Commission report 
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identify them for the purpose of increasing the value of the insight for sale to 
advertisers and marketers. 
 
Research on personal data-sharing in the economics of privacy (e.g. Acquisti 2010 
etc.) have found that disclosing personal data do bring benefits to individuals, such 
as immediate monetary compensation (e.g. discounts), intangible benefits 
(personalisation and customisation of  information content) and price reduction as 
an effect of more targeted advertising and marketing, information-based price 
discrimination, and more targeted ads to better inform consumers (cf. Akcura and 
Srinivasan 2005). However, such sharing also brings about costs and negative 
externalities for example, privacy costs, and subjective and objective privacy harms. 
Conversely, it has also been suggested that sweeping privacy regulation that result 
in firms not  being able to obtain personal data will lead to opportunity cost and 
inefficiencies (Acquisti 2010; August and Tunca 2006; Van Zandt 2004; Anderson 
and de Palma 2005; Hann et al. 2006). 
 
With the increasing economic value of personal data, scholars have been polarised 
into two main camps. The first, regulatory camp advocates for privacy protection as 
an end in itself, regardless of economic consequences. The underlying notion of 
such an advocacy is that privacy is a human right to personal data protection.  This 
is consistent with the EU Charter that data being processed for specified purposes 
and with consent of the person concerned or with some other legitimate basis is 
laid down by law (Godel, Litchfield, and Mantovani 2012, p.42; Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 364, p. 10, 18.12.2000, Article 8). 
Enforcement of regulation would also pose a challenge since there is doubt as to 
how much regulatory powers governments actually have over the Internet. Any 
attempt of territorial governments to enforce privacy regulations could increase 
the likelihood of data-driven companies (whose profits depend significantly on 
data) to employ legal arbitrage, moving to jurisdictions outside the regulation. In 
the extreme, adverse selection could drive out firms benefiting from the data 
economic chain, reducing tax revenues for the country. 
 
With the continuing advancement of digital technology, the argument for personal 
data protection has evolved from the human-rights concern to an economic 
rationalisation based on the trade-offs between risks and return (Godel, Litchfield, 
and Mantovani 2012). This is the approach taken by the self-regulatory camp, 
proposing that a market solution exists as a trade-off between privacy and the 
benefit from data usage (Acquisti 2010). This camp proposes that individuals could 
be assigned property rights to the information so that they are able to contract 
with third parties on how they might use it. Legal scholars have advocated the 
‘propertization’ of personal data and argued against the imposition of legal limits 
on data trade i.e. that there is no need for “inalienabilities” (i.e. any restriction[s] 
on the transferability, ownership or use of an entitlement (Rose-Ackerman 1985). 
The self-regulatory framework advocates the exchange of data and data protection 
to increase aggregate welfare, emphasising market self-correction for efficiency 
outcomes and the regulators’ role as one of steering the market through a 
combination of incentives, disclosure policies and even liability (Acquisti 2010).   
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Unfortunately, the practical implementation of a self-regulatory framework faces 
huge challenges because many of the data exchange contracts are incomplete and 
there is very little transparency about the secondary uses for the data (Beresford, 
Kübler, and Preibusch 2010; Godel, Litchfield, and Mantovani 2012). Property rights 
are a challenge for individuals to exercise when the personal data is held by firms 
collecting the data and not by individuals themselves (Shapiro and Varian, 1997; 
Laudon 1996). Since personal data is often mixed with other data belonging to the 
firm, the lack of boundaries would make property rights for individuals too much of 
a challenge to implement and enforce, leading to higher transaction costs. In 
addition, third parties buying and selling personal data could impose social costs on 
individuals since individuals are not directly involved in these transactions, resulting 
in the externalities that are not internalised by the firm (Godel, Litchfield, and 
Mantovani 2012; Odlyzko 2003; Swire and Litan 1998; Acquisti 2010).  
 
Aside from the challenge in implementation, others have also argued against the 
trade or propertization of personal data due to its impact on privacy. With the 
development of technology and devices that can generate finely-grained 
information about consumers’ privacy preferences (McGeveran 2001), trade of 
personal data could lead to its commodification and contribute to additional 
privacy intrusions (Tuan, 2000). Additionally, there could also be a risk of market 
failure. Recognising property rights in personal data could not only encourage more 
trade in personal data and thus result in less privacy (Cohen 2010), it could lead to 
underinvestment in technology and services that enable the expression of privacy 
preferences. This would then result in greater information asymmetries between 
firms and individuals whose data is collected (Langer 2003; Schwartz 2004). 
Scholars have concluded that there is just no simple rule on whether privacy of 
personal data raises or reduces welfare as it depends on the circumstances 
(Hermalin and Katz 2006; Taylor 2004). However, it is commonly acknowledged 
that a free market in personal data will not provide an economically-efficient 
outcome. The degree of negative externalities within and across markets will 
depend on circumstances, as will any increase or decrease in welfare (Hui and Png 
2006).  
 
Personal data is widely used  to create personalised offers such as products, prices, 
diets, recommendations, insurance, that are tailored to the characteristics of 
particular persons. There is much literature on whether personalisation improves 
exchanges and market efficiency, drawing from work on asymmetric information 
(Akerlof 1970; Spence 1973; Stiglitz 1975) and product differentiation (Mussa and 
Rosen 1978; Katz 1984; Moorthy 1984).   It is no surprise therefore that new ways 
to gather more personal information would proliferate and their resulting data 
would find a market. Current regulation now implicitly acknowledge that personal 
data is a commodity, tradable and subject to the laws of supply and demand 
(Godel, Litchfield, and Mantovani 2012).  
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Mechanics of Personal Data Exchange on the Internet 
 
The earliest form of digital personal data was derived from supermarket 
transactions, surveys and polls. These created the early data brokers that trade 
with firms, consumer data obtained from various sources, and individuals are 
generally not active agents in these transactions. Such transactions have had a 
market since the advent of ICT, one in which market research companies thrive, 
giving insights to firms based on their analysis. 
 
The development of the Internet and the proliferation of e-commerce have 
resulted in an explosion of personal data supply and with it, public concern about 
privacy, as reviewed earlier.  Personal data can be gathered from visits to websites, 
then used to analyse browsing and shopping behaviours. With cookies, data can be 
collected across all website visits and individuals can be easily tracked as they leave 
behind a data trail. With clickstream and identifying information, websites can 
profile visitors to a high level of accuracy.  
 
Firms giving personal data to third party analytics services to obtain insights on 
their customers also contribute to the creation of more personal data. This is often 
covered by the firms’ service terms of conditions to which individuals must agree. 
Insights are sometimes shared with customers themselves e.g. sleep quality by 
Fitbit. 
 
Firms selling on personal data to data brokers also contribute to the market. This 
may be legal if the data has been suitably anonymised or even without 
anonymisation if the firm is based in a jurisdiction that does not have data 
protection laws. Finally, a ‘market for privacy’ exchange services where consumers 
buy technology to protect their personal information. In this market, some business 
models centre on bridging the market for privacy and the market for personal data 
by providing technology or services to give consumers more control over their 
personal data and also to provide them with opportunities to create more explicit 
exchanges of their personal data. 
 
It is important to note that while a thriving market exists for personal data, a vast 
amount of personal data is not shared by firms. Employee data, students exam 
results, interactions on many smartphone apps are some of the data that have 
stayed within firms and have not been shared with third parties. However, with 
advancement in technologies and increasing API access, there is a growing 
sentiment that personal data liberated from these walled siloes could create 
greater innovation and opportunities. On the other hand, there is also increasing 
fear that liberating personal data would generate externalities that are socially 
inefficient, compromising privacy without any mechanism for internalisation. 
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The Value of Personal Data 
 
Not all personal data is created equal and its availability in the market place 
depends considerably on its value. Generally, economists consider personal data or 
personal information, whether or not it is in the form of bitstrings, to be valuable in 
four ways. 
 
First, personal data is used by firms to discriminate between segments with 
differing willingness  to pay or reservation prices or for general segmentation of 
customers with different personal attributes (Mussa and Rosen 1978; Katz 1984; 
Moorthy 1984; Hart and Tirole 1988; Tirole 1988; Png 1998). Economists have 
concluded that price discrimination leads to socially efficient outcomes, and 
exploitation of personal data could lead to ex post inefficiencies, over Investment in 
information (Hirshleifer 1971) and consumers being priced out of the market when 
there is more personal data available (e.g. Hart and Tirole 1988; Thisse  and Vives 
1988; Fudenberg and Villas-Boas 2006). 
 
The second stream of economics literature on the value of personal information 
concerns the issue of a firm collecting personal data in one market for use by itself 
or selling it on to others in another market.  In such cases, the firm would have big 
incentives to collect personal data, even at the expense of  some  of its own 
potential consumers (Taylor 2004). Taylor (2004) found that the option of selling 
personal data for extra revenue reduces social efficiency on the demand side in 
terms of loss in trades and increase in deadweight losses as well as on the supply 
side in terms of the cost (and risks) of collecting the data. Selling personal data into 
a different market also creates cross market externalities (Hui and Png 2006).  
 
The third form of value of personal data comes from its use by firms to directly 
promote to consumers, often through unsolicited promotions such as direct selling, 
mail, catalogues, emails and advertising. Economists have considered such 
promotions as imposing costs of intrusion on individuals and view them as a direct 
externality (Camp and Osorio 2003), unrelated to the terms of a transaction or 
trading relationship (Laudon 1996). This raises the need, and in turn creating a 
market for seclusion, the need for solitude. Finally, the use of personal data also 
spurs the market for autonomy, the need to be in control of, or opt out from, 
surveillance and observation. Hui and Png (2006) argued for an understanding of all 
three aspects of privacy - secrecy, seclusion and autonomy - that personal data 
feed into. The fourth form of value, one that is the focus of this paper, comes from 
personal data use in real-time, on demand and dynamically connected markets. 
 
 
Personal Data in Real-time, On Demand and Dynamically-Connected Markets 
 
Much of the work on personal data goes back to a time when information flows 
were slower. With the recent Facebook/Cambridge Analytica incident, it is clear 
that personal data has moved on. The Internet has done much to expedite this, 
even into the physical space. Connected things have made available person-
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generated data from the consumption of cyber or cyber-physical goods and 
services. This brings the physical world into the digital world at a phenomenal pace. 
The digital world now almost mirrors the physical world in terms of a way of life. 
Where in the past I woke up, went to work, shopped at malls and relaxed through 
physical leisure activities, the digital world now consumes a large part of human life 
in terms of work (many people work online), shopping (at Internet shopping sites) 
and relaxation (by watching videos and reading the news online). The Internet is no 
longer merely a ‘channel’ for the purchase of goods or information, but a medium 
of living that interacts with the physical (cf. Poster 2001). Data generated now 
include Expressions (e.g. words from social posts and messages), Spending (data 
from banking transactions), Photos (taken from the camera on the phone), 
Environmental (temperature and air quality from a wearable), Calendar events 
(from inputs into a digital calendar), Interactions (such as data from using a fridge 
or IoT device, or from listening to music), Activities (sport activity or sleep data 
collected from wearables such as Fitbit), Location (from a smartphone GPS) and 
Search (word typed into search engines), which I assign the acronym of ESPECIALS. 
The ESPECIALS set, which is by no means exhaustive, is an exemplar set where 
individual behaviours are ‘visible’ through data. In these cases, individuals are 
directly involved in generating the personal data and sometimes may not even 
know that the data is generated (e.g. when opening a door equipped with a 
sensor). The ‘exchange’ is part of a consumption activity and not an explicit 
exchange of data by the individual. The data is sometimes content data (e.g. words 
typed into a message) and sometimes metadata (the time the message was sent). 
This data has been growing in terms of value to data brokers, who can use it to 
profile a person’s interest and daily living much more comprehensively as well as 
uniquely.  
 
The availability of API access has made possible the sharing of data such as those in 
the ESPECIALS set with third parties, and personal data that used to be static and 
useful for research and insight is now available in real time, on-demand and 
dynamically updated. Thus, the ability to infer context, interests, preferences, 
priorities at every moment of a person’s daily activity is now possible, if the data 
can be made available. API access is expanding, and more personal data collected 
and generated means a higher likelihood of increasing its use. Having real time, on 
demand and dynamic understanding of a person now fuels hyper-targeting, the 
ability to communicate directly with individuals in real time, on demand with 
various artefacts (e.g. ads, newsletters, articles, videos) across channels (social 
media, browsers) with dynamic messages and content. Hyper-targeting requires an 
understanding of the persona, which is aided by a copious amount of personal 
data. Hyper-targeting is essentially a product’s choice of spatial locations (Hotelling 
1929; Salop 1979) when the marginal cost of product is zero, which is the case for 
many cyber-social products such as news or music. These products are able to 
personalise algorithmically based on personal data updates.  
 
This is now moving into physical products as well. As physical products embed 
sensors or software interfaces, the marginal cost of product variety becomes zero. 
Wathieu (2004) investigated product variety but only in terms of how enabling 
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privacy may increase the firm’s advertising costs since the firm may not be able to 
segment demand using personal data. With a software/cyber layer, product variety 
can be achieved dynamically and on-demand (Yoo, Henfridsson, and Lyytinen 
2010). Economists generally believe that producers should and will produce more 
and more of the good, up until market saturation, and competitive markets would 
drive the price of a good to zero. However, when the marginal cost of product 
variety is zero with personal data being infinitely expansible, the product can 
achieve perfect price discrimination and perfect spatial monopoly. While society 
may see too little innovation in Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, we are now seeing 
innovation in real time, aided by machine learning. In essence, this is what personal 
data fuels. To the extent that the demand for personal data is so high, firms would 
attempt to get more of it generation from the source. Personal data is now 
generated when a person explicitly gives it to firms such as through doing IQ 
quizzes or Personality tests in the case of Cambridge Analytica, or by asking cute 
questions to determine the person’s context. I now move towards more formally 
articulating and theorising the economic properties of personal data as a digital 
good. 
 
 
Theorising the Economic Properties of Personal Data 
 
I consider a broader definition of personal data for the purpose of understanding its 
economics and define it axiomatically as the data about a person, and/or the data 
generated by a person. The former may be assessment reviews on an employee or 
CCTV camera footage of a person buying groceries. The latter may be data 
generated when a person opens a fridge door or reads an online newspaper. Each 
dataset has a source e.g. Facebook, Calendar or a door. Personal data, as bitstring 
data, shares some of the properties of normal digital goods. It is non-rivalrous in 
the sense that the consumption by the firm’s customer does not prevent the firm 
itself from consuming it  (Shapiro and Varian  1998). Second, bitstring data is 
infinitely expansible. That means a firm’s bitstring data of a person can be copied to 
another space with very low marginal cost of re-production. Finally, bitstring data 
has a non-excludability property, implying that it is near impossible to exclude 
others from consuming the data. Non-excludability, however, depends on the legal 
and technological framework and it is entirely possible to exclude others from 
consuming through intellectual property rights, tied to the original copyright 
holder, or through a technical barrier such as encryption. If however, the original 
copyright holder could be persuaded to share, either by regulation or by consent of 
the person, it is entirely possible the market could be flooded with the same 
bitstring data. Formally, we can state this as 𝑥"(𝑡) ∈ 𝑋( ={𝑥+(𝑡), 𝑥-(𝑡), . . . 𝑥((𝑡)}|, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑍(, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑅 
where 𝑥"(𝑡) denotes the value of attribute i generated at time t within the dataset 
X. An example would be a post on Facebook where attribute i = post, t = time of 
post and 𝑥"(𝑡) = content (e.g. “I love wine!”). Note that in some services, the 
person generating the data may be unknown e.g. someone searching in an Internet 
cafe. If the person is known, for example the data was generated when the user 
was logged into an account, we can denote the data as {𝑥"5(𝑡)} ⊂ 𝑋( . 
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Personal data as a digital good is also recombinant in that other digital goods can 
be created from combining them with features that are absent from the original, 
parent digital goods (Quah 2003).  That means it is possible to create a new dataset 
A where 𝐴 = {𝑥"5(𝑡), 𝑦"5(𝑡), . . . } An example is a set of Facebook posts in various 
location over time. 
 
There is, however, one property that separates normal digital goods and personal 
data. Digital goods normally exhibit indivisibility or discreteness. This means that 
the consumption of a digital good such as music is usually the consumption of a 
whole good (the song); a fractional copy is worth very little. Personal data is 
divisible. For example, for a location dataset, the set of location data between 7am 
and 9am may be meaningful for firms who wish to understand commuting 
journeys. Furthermore, where a digital good like music is expensive to produce and 
cheap to reproduce, personal data is cheap to produce and cheap to reproduce, 
although excludability through the legal framework to protect consumers is 
increasing its costs. Finally, personal data can be discrete and bounded, such as a 
data point on age, or continuous, such as location data.  
 
The property of divisibility together with recombinability results in the ability of 
personal data to evolve a derivative which I term as inferential signal. In contract 
theory, signalling is a concept where one party conveys some information about 
themselves to another party. The most typical example is Spence’s (1973) seminal 
paper on how acquiring formal education such as degrees is a signal of individuals’ 
abilities to potential employers. The value of the degree as a signal comes from the 
fact that the employer believes the signal i.e. the degree is able to separate higher-
ability from lower-ability employees, and therefore the employer is willing offer 
higher wages to degree holders, even if they do not know that to be true of a 
particular employee beforehand.  
 
Figure 1: Signals are inferred from personal data 
 
 
  
 
14 
Similarly, personal data can form combinations where an inferential signal can be 
generated. An inferential signal could be context (in-town-shopping), interests 
(loves-wine), priorities (needs-more-sleep), preferences (wears-only-jeans), 
decisions (buy-shampoo), intent (going-to-Boston), behaviours (ate-Thai-food) or 
persona (savvy-digital-native). Thus, personal data divisibility, recombinability and 
expansionability can result in the creation of infinite inferential signals.  
 
 
Signal composition and quality. Signal composition is the composition of data 
within the signal. Within each signal the frequency of data, as well as the inclusion 
of other data could have a direct impact on the signal quality. For example, 
repeated orders of wine from supermarket purchases could be a signal that the 
individual likes wine; a Facebook posting of “The 2009 Medoc was excellent” is also 
a contribution to the signal. Thus the composition of each signal could also have 
the property of near-decomposability (Simon 2002), where intra-signal data 
frequency linkages may be stronger than inter-signal frequency linkages. Formally, 
we can consider an inferential signal of S defined as the image of a function from a 
personal data set A i.e. f: A → S and A = {x?@(tB), y?@(tB). . } 
 
Simple Application of the model on Identity as a signal. Identification can be 
considered an inferential signal that is not time dependent. For example, it is 
commonly said that 87% of Americans can be identified through their birthdate, 
five digital zip code and gender. Thus, an identity inferential signal S for person α 
could consist of:S+@ = f(x+, y+, z+)|x+ ∈ XG, y+ ∈ YG, z+ ∈ ZG where x+ =birthdate, y+ = zipcode, z+ = gender 
 
However, identity signal composition can also be obtained from an individual’s 
location between 11pm and 6am, and homeowner’s data: S-@2 = f(a+, b+)|a+ ∈AG, b+ ∈ BG where a=location between 11pm and 6am, b=homeowner’s name. 
Finally, identity signal composition can consist of only one data point SX@ ={p+}|p+ ∈ PG where p+ = passportname 
 
This means signal can be obtained from multiple data sources. For each of the 
identity signals above, one could posit the quality, or the likelihood of the signal to 
be true, as:0 < ρ(S+@) < ρ(S-@) < ρ(S X@) ≤ 1 
 
This application is therefore the case of how data protection regulation (DPR) 
defines personal data. DPR definition of personal data specifies the data that relate 
to an identified or identifiable person or persons, a definition that is widespread 
across literature for the purpose of regulating its use. This application of our model 
therefore considers the DPR definition as personal data with an inferential signal of 
“personal identity’. It also raises an interesting issue of when personal data usage 
falls under the purview of enforceable regulation, perhaps when the probability 0.5 < ρ(S@) < 1.  
 
Signal access and perishability. Conceptually, there are two types of signals that 
are valuable for the market. First, durable signals that are less time or context 
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dependent. These signals are, for example, identity, personality, marital status, 
demographic attributes etc. They are valuable because studies have found 
correlations between these signals and their propensity to buy certain goods and 
they are used to target customers. The second type of signal I define here is 
perishable signals. These are context and often time dependent, for example 
‘would like a cup of tea’ or ‘have 15 minutes before train leaves’. Such signals will 
perish either because the need is gone or it has been satiated. For the purpose of 
this paper, I denote all signals S(t) as dynamic, time dependent signals tb < t < t+ 
and tb is the time the signal is active and t+ is when the signal is perished i.e. S(tb) = S(t+) = undefined. 
 
 
Matching Inferential Signals: The Model  
 
Perishable signals are precious commodity to firms, individuals and society. 
Combining personal data, machines and algorithms can improve human decision, 
action and societal coordination, especially when the action can be performed in 
real time and on demand. Combinations of personal data and algorithms can 
generate signals from early detection of depression from an individual’s social 
media posting, signals from early detection of cancer or other diseases resulting 
from combining data from real behaviours and healthcare, or signals from using an 
individual’s history to consider preferences and options for the future. Signals have 
gains for firms as well. First, since personalisation from infinite product varieties is 
possible with a digital layer at low marginal costs, there is much surplus to be 
gained by firms to position their offering to match the signals if they are precise, 
good quality and the match occurs before perishing. Second, consumer need for a 
product (e.g. insulin or tea) may not be known even to the individual until the need 
or urgency arises. Perishable signals allow markets to form outside of conventional 
markets and enable exchanges to occur, surfacing latent need and increasing 
willingness to pay (Ng 2014).   
 
 
Formally, we construct a matching game as follows: 
 
Consider a person being asked to share data by signing on to an app. The person 
can choose to share or not share. At time t when a signal is active, the firm decides 
to offer a service, a discount or perhaps a message of advertising. Nature then 
decides on whether the signal is matched, in which case the person obtains a 
payoff of πp -v where v is the vulnerability cost that comes with sharing data 
(privacy, seclusion etc.) and the firm obtains a payoff of πf - c where c is the cost of 
matching. 
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Figure 2: Formal game of perishable signal matching 
 
 
If the person decides not to share, the firm can also decide to offer or not offer the 
service and the payoffs are the same except without vulnerability cost, since data is 
not shared, nor the cost of matching. 
 
 
 
We can depict the payoffs in a matrix set out below. 
 
 
 
Proposition 1: The firm will always offer and the person will always prefer not to 
share data 
 
 
 Firm 
Offer Do not offer 
Person 
Share data (!"# − (1 −!)(,!") − (1 −!)*) (0, -v) 
Do not share data (!"#, !")) (0, 0) 
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The above payoffs show that the because 𝜌 > 0, the person knows that the firm 
will always offer. Since the firm will always offer, the person would prefer not to 
share data and the equilibrium strategy will be (do not share, offer). 
 
From the above proposition, the firm would certainly change its strategy. This is 
usually the case for many apps that force users to sign up before they can even 
begin to use the service. In so doing, the Nash equilibrium is can be designed to 
become (share, offer). 
 
 
 
The problem when this happens is that when signal quality drops very low, the firm 
will not offer.  
 
Theorem 1: When 𝜌 → 0 Perishable signals face market failure 
 
The logic is simple, when 𝜌 → 0, The firm would prefer not to offer so as not to 
incur the cost c. The person will always prefer to share data because he will 
(weakly) prefer to have a positive payoff to none at all. 
 
This simple model shows that it doesn't not require privacy concerns for markets to 
fail. Even when there is willingness to share data and willlingness to create signals, 
market failure arises due to inability to match before a signal perishes. 
 
As more personal data become available, in real time and on demand, signals have 
become more accurate, fuelling the advertising, geo targeting and location-based 
marketing economy. In a digitally-connected society, real-time signals perish 
quickly, which in turn fuels more intrusive data collection that would keep signals 
proliferating. As regulators react to the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal, 
access to real-time, dynamic personal data and data signals is becoming a challenge 
as economic, regulatory and privacy concerns will drive up costs for personal data 
exchanges, including social costs. As a resource, personal data that is valuable for 
real time, on demand and dynamic signalling runs the risk of being  more scarce, 
less real time, less on demand and less dynamic. This not only means that the 
incumbents that hold it become more powerful, opportunities of un-exploitable 
data opportunities for the good of individuals and society, lost. As technology 
 Firm 
Offer Do not offer 
Person 
Share data (!"# − (1 −!)(, !") − (1 −!)*) (0, -v) 
Do not share data (0,0) (0, 0) 
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advances, the infrastructure that creates this value is showing its weaknesses and 
vulnerability. In the face of an  increasingly-empowered population of connected 
citizens, the centralised organisation control of personal data has become 
restricting.  
 
 
Work in market design through “microeconomic engineering” (Roth 1991) have 
shown that transactions and institutions matter and could be redesigned to 
engender better market outcomes.  Given the market failure, a micro-economic 
redesign of the personal data exchange market may be a solution. The next section 
reports the micro economic redesign and engineering of the personal data 
exchange and its implementation. 
 
 
Legal and Technological Design and Creation of the HAT (Hub-of-all-Things) for 
Creating Person-controlled Personal Data (PPD) Asset Class 
 
Property rights is said to be the most important factor for markets of a good to 
exist. This is because markets not only enable the exchange of a good, but trade the 
various exclusive rights associated with the good in terms of its use, exclusion and 
alienability (Demsetz 1967; Alston, Libecap, and  Schneider 1995, Carruthers and 
Babb 2000). For the exchange of a digital good such as personal data to occur in a 
meaningful way, some exclusive rights must exist with the owner to exclude others 
from making arbitrary copies of the data. This is the case also with personal data 
controlled by firms, which I term OPD (organisation-controlled personal data). OPD 
access rights are granted to other organisations through API access terms and 
conditions or through permitted selling of data to data brokers. I define PPD as 
person-controlled personal data, the personal data where intellectual property 
rights and excludability of the data (control) is with individuals. Since digital 
personal data consists of bitstrings, and is created by the technology that collects it, 
it is possible that rights could be retained by individuals if they legally owned a 
technological artefact capable of real-time, on-demand and dynamic exchange of 
personal data. In addition, since personal data is non-rivalrous and infinitely 
expansible, copies of the data may be accorded with a different set of legal rights, 
rights that could be controlled by individuals themselves. Finally, since signals are 
generated from combinations of personal data, the quality of the signals would 
depend on the ease of different personal datasets to be combined, bundled and 
exchanged so that the economic value of the data signals are high.  
 
To make the PPD asset class a reality, I present the design and built of the HAT 
(Hub-of-all-Things) technology and legal artefact. 
 
Technology. For brevity, the HAT technological architecture can be seen at 
https://developers.hubofallthings.com/home/tech-stack/HAT_core.html. In 
essence, the HAT is designed and constructed as private, standalone databases 
embedded within containerised microservices for personal data that have clear 
boundaries of data at rest, data in transit and data in use. Aside from just being a 
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datastore, containerised microservices wrapped around the database means it can 
be a “micro-server”, capable of processing data within. By isolating each HAT 
micro-server from one another so that every HAT is one containerised 
microservices-enabled database per person, boundaries are clear and rights can be 
bestowed. Technologically, the schema (data structure) was chosen to be flexible 
for outbound data, but keeping the rigidity of inbound data. Apps that give data 
into the HAT retain their original table and data structures within their namespaces 
e.g. Facebook namespace in the HAT has a Facebook table of data, same with their 
original names, similar to Spotify, Google Calendar, Fitbit etc. Outbound data from 
the HAT, however, can allow infinite combinations of data values across datasets 
e.g. Twitter tweet at 3pm with iPhone location and heartbeat. Each of these data 
values and bundles can be named and then exchanged through standard APIs using 
standard Internet protocols and encryption in real time. Within the HAT comes the 
technological capability of embedding functions e.g. pre-trained machine learning 
algorithms that transform data within the HAT and generate new data signals that 
sit within the HAT, which can be exchanged through the standard APIs if the 
individual wishes to. 
 
Legal Rights. Personal data use contracts cannot specify all states of nature or all 
future actions and use of the data in advance. When there are states or actions that 
cannot be verified ex post by third parties, they are therefore not possible to be 
contractible ex ante. This means that the contract must include discretion and that 
discretion is to be exercised by whoever is allocated the ‘ownership’ rights to the 
personal data. The literature on incomplete contracts (see Grossman and Hart 
1986; Hart and Moore 1990; Aghion and Bolton 1992; Dewatripont and Tirole 1994) 
has typically focused on the question of which party in a contract should have the 
right to undertake certain actions in the management of those assets. If contracts 
were complete, it would make no difference who was allocated that right, since 
actions taken are a function of the situations stipulated in the contract. However, 
incompleteness of personal data contracts matter in terms of who has the power to 
take action, and the presumption is always that the economic actors will do so 
according to their interests. Deciding who should have the power to take certain 
actions is therefore a matter of foreseeing which actors will be most likely to act in 
the desired way. The allocation of power matters when it is not possible to specify 
in advance precisely how that power should be exercised. In the case of personal 
data, it is clear that future usage of one’s personal data must rest in the control of 
individuals, because this would reduce the incentive for the firm to sell on the data, 
especially when such an action may be obscured from the individual.   
 
Legal ownership of rights to the micro-server can be bestowed due to the presence 
of clear boundaries resulting from HAT containerisation (see appendix A). Owners 
of such an artefact can therefore be afforded all of the intellectual property rights 
of the micro-server, reducing ambiguity of personal data use. Containerising one 
individual’s data within his own database wrapped with microservices allows 
individuals themselves to be a ‘data controller’ and ‘data processor’.  Finally, the  
HAT core technology is uploaded to GitHub under an open-sourced AGPL license 
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(not be closed even if built upon), ensuring that any code within the HAT, which 
reveals how data is being handled within the HAT, is transparent to all. 
 
In terms of usage of data within with HAT, it is clearly necessary for the data to be 
unencumbered so that full excludability rights are retained by the individual 
through the HAT and not by the source of the data. In this manner, micro-server 
access to data from the current sources such as Google or Facebook could be 
considered as subject access, whether directly or through a third party, which, 
under European law, suggests that the ensuing data retrieved by individuals are 
owned by them. While this is legally not proven in case law, a case can be made 
that micro-server owners have rights to reuse and reshare their own data within it 
as co-producers of the same data. Given that data within the boundaries of the firm 
cannot be meaningfully “propertised” by individuals, a non-rivalrous copy of the 
same data within a HAT micro-server with the same intellectual property rights on 
the copy for individuals as the rights of the source for the firm, can be an equitable 
arrangement.  
 
I now set up a series of propositions for PPD. Instead of proving the propositions 
formally, the propositions are taken into the design of an artefact and the redesign 
of the market for personal data which I would elaborate on. 
 
Datasets. As presented earlier, signals require access to personal data. In the 
current state of the personal data economy, datasets are contained within the 
siloes of ‘apps’. Each app could hold simple data of booking travel (Trainline) or 
choosing the clothing to wear (Stylebook), or managing a diet (MyFitnessPal). The 
combined data from all the apps could create much better signals. However, only 
some apps sell on the data and the regulatory climate of selling data is creating 
higher costs and risks. This suggests that the personal data market is narrowing and 
privacy concerns may hand greater monopolistic power to incumbents that hold 
much more data. The risky environment results in hoarding, since access is a 
challenge, creating greater security risks. However, if a micro-server could deliver 
outsourced benefits for giving individuals their own data such that it can still be 
accessed by firms in real time and on demand, cross-demand for data would fuel 
more datasets coming into the HAT micro-server. 
 
Proposition 2: PPD can generate more datasets i.e. 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠{𝑆l} < 𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠{𝑆5} 
 
Signal quality. Since transactions of personal data and their signals do not involve 
the person, externalities occur. This is not merely with regards to privacy but also 
data quality, since the person is not a stakeholder of the data being transacted. 
With PPD, matched signals are actioned upon by individuals themselves, hence 
they are incentivised to ensure that the data is accurate. In addition, data brought 
into a micro-server is liberated from its structures, such that different combinations 
of data from the different structures could be created, resulting in better signals. 
 
Proposition 3: Ceteris paribus, PPD creates higher signal quality i.e. 0 < 𝜌(𝑆l) <𝜌(𝑆5) < 1 
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Signal buyers. Signals are expensive, since purchasing, consolidating, aggregating 
and analysing personal data for sale is costly. With greater regulatory controls there 
is greater scarcity and the price for personal data (and their derivative insights or 
signals) is increasing. Hence, smaller apps that could better tailor or personalise 
their products through signals could be priced out of the market. However if signals 
belong to individuals, being able to reuse and reshare signals for matches results in 
lower marginal costs for firms. 
 
Proposition 4: PPD creates pareto efficient outcomes 
 
Signal matching and perishability. “Matching” is the focus of economic models on 
who does what and who gets what, particularly when a good is scarce and 
allocation is an issue (Niederle, Roth, and Sönmez 2008). For OPD, data brokers buy 
data and generate insights often long after the data is generated. This means only 
some signals are available, those which are stable and less time reliant. However, a 
HAT micro-server that is real time and on demand could obtain matches before it 
perishes, driving the demand for more signals and better signal matches.  
 
Proposition 5: PPD Matching is more stable and efficient compared to OPD 
 
Source constraints. While personal data could be accessible through open APIs by 
third party services sharing amongst one another, data collectors impose 
constraints on its use, creating legal excludability. This restricts what personal data 
can be used for. With PPD from HATs, individuals do not face such constraints. 
 
Proposition 6: PPD reduces source constraints on excludability. 
 
Given the above propositions, we propose that transaction costs for PPD would be 
low and a bargaining solution could exist (Coase 1960). What is then needed is to 
establish the market for PPD. We now turn to the economic design of the HAT data 
exchange system. 
 
 
Microeconomic Design and Engineering of the HAT Data Exchange System for the 
PPD Market 
 
Potentially, PPD could complete with OPD, at least at the beginning. Over time, PPD 
could prevail due to the quality of the asset class (as per propositions above). The 
current personal data market is imperfect, asymmetric and incomplete. Imperfect 
because of the ability of firms to create monopolistic competition with an extensive 
variety of cyber-physical products that can be personalised with personal data. 
Asymmetric because firms often have extensive information of consumers online 
through cookies and third-party data to price discriminate and target, and 
incomplete because follow-on uses of personal data are uncertain and ambiguous. 
PPD could make personal data markets more efficient by reducing asymmetry and 
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the ability to create complete contracts due to its accessibility in real time and on 
demand. 
 
PPD Supply. For a well-functioning market, PPD supply must be in place; this supply 
of data into the HAT, thus becoming PPD, must then have the capability to be 
stored, processed, transformed into data signals and exchanged in real time and on 
demand unencumbered by the source. Today, Facebook, Google, Fitbit and many 
Internet services allow API access of data by third-party services primarily to create 
lock-in, engagement and greater network effects from combined services sharing of 
personal data. Access by an individual is therefore technologically possible, 
although legally ambiguous. In addition, European General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) coming into effect on 25 May 2018 compel the need for data 
portability in individuals’ right of access. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      Figure 3: Value trapped in walled silos 
 
While the law is vague on whether this means API access (thereby giving individuals 
real-time, on-demand and dynamic access), the fact that firms share personal data 
between themselves with consent would suggest that mounting a legal challenge 
for individuals’ right to API access may be winnable, if legislators do not compel 
firms   to do this. Notwithstanding the law, signals that are most valuable e.g. 
intent, preferences and priorities for example, can already be created with only 
ESPECIALS data, most of it available through API access already. Granting API access 
to an individual’s HAT is merely an indirect mechanism to companies wanting a 
lock-in and a network effect, but inserting a new right of excludability (control) 
exercised by the individual. 
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PPD Demand. The creation of the PPD asset brings about the challenge of designing 
coordination between economic actors for more efficient and socially-optimal 
outcomes. Coordination has been said to be the economic problem that needs to 
be addressed (Knight 1951, p6; Leijonhufvud 1981, p321-322). In the way that the 
PPD asset is analogous to digital labour, a market-based coordination structure 
with interactions of demand (for PPD and PPD signals) and supply (of accessible 
personal data) could be a reinforcing loop, generating matches that can cause a 
spontaneous and ongoing coordination of separate economic activities between 
individuals and firms. For that to happen, there must be thickness (Niederle, Roth, 
and Sönmez 2008), a condition where a sufficient number of participants come 
together to transact. In the current market, data brokers have amassed a sizeable 
number of buyers interested in personal data and insights2. The proliferation of the 
‘app economy’ has created marketplaces that guarantee personal data supply for 
OPD and the $61billion advertising economy has created a demand for  OPD that 
could help influence, target, promote and sell to the millions who are online. PPD 
would need to compete in that market. The PPD market has to also overcome 
congestion by making transactions fast enough and yet having enough alternatives 
to choose from. For OPD, this is currently done through API access, and a 
distributed network on the Internet, often out of the jurisdictions of territorial 
governments. Finally, the PPD market must be safe to transact which means it is 
more optimal to transact within the marketplace than outside (Vulkan, Roth, and 
Neeman 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure	4:	Decentralised	model	to	unlock	better	signals	
 
 
PPD Market Strategy 
 
There are currently more than a million apps on devices such as the iPhone and 
Android phones. Every app downloaded and used by an individual has a direct 
                                               
2 https://www.ftc.gov/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-
may-2014 
  
 
24 
relationship between the firm and the user. Each dataset of app personal data sits 
within each app, walled and silo-ed. Many of such apps belong to companies that 
are small, only a few large ones are the likes of Facebook and Google. All apps 
could benefit from more personal data and in particular, personal data signals. If a 
signal is about wanting coffee, a coffee app already on a phone may be interested 
to acquire it. If it is a need to buy an item, or medicine, apps within a person’s 
phone are already spatially (location and time) within the reach of individuals. 
 
This means that signals can be best matched by the firms of  these phone apps. 
These apps have an in-app market of their own - between a firm and its users. In 
addition, these apps generate their own personal data whether it is train booking 
or wardrobe assistance. If the HAT is able to take on namespaces for the app data 
and also transform it privately to create new data signals to be bought and 
consumed by the app, thickness, congestion and safety can be achieved within 
every app as an internal market. Thickness, because the app has an existing user 
base to sell to. Congestion, because signal transactions can follow the same manner 
of transacting data within the app and safety, because the firm has already a 
relationship with the individual through the app. Such an internal data exchange 
can be a marketplace setting for PPD and PPD signals.  
 
Proposition 6: Creating exchanges of PPD within a firm’s internal market of its own 
customers can (1) create thickness; (2) reduce congestion; and (3) create an 
environment of safety 
 
What this implies is that PPD and PPD signals are brokered for sale between a firm 
and its own customers within the firm’s own app, rather than creating a different 
marketplace. This could be implemented through the firm issuing ‘private data 
accounts’ to its own customers with the intent of buying PPD or PPD signals. As 
other apps begin to store data within the person’s micro-server, firms can request 
data not generated by them, thus enabling the individual to be a multi-sided 
market for PPD. 
 
Proposition 7: Decentralised PPD generates network effects through resharing and 
reusing PPD between apps and firms 
 
 
Market Redesign: Implementation and Early Findings 
 
The above propositions were implemented technologically, in tandem with the 
microeconomic model; the HAT was created as a one-database per person 
wrapped with containerised microservices and accorded the HAT owner with full 
legal rights to the database and the data within (thus creating PPD). Services built 
to host HATs on the cloud and the exchange of PPD data between firm and 
individuals  were built as API services, fully encrypted end to end, preserving the 
privacy of the HAT owner (even from the host) and giving full control to individuals. 
The HAT platform was rolled out through the formation of a company, HAT Data 
Exchange (HATDeX). HATDeX built service for HAT owners to view, use, control and 
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exchange data easily with toggles and button presses. Individuals pulled their data 
into the HAT through “Data Plugs” and shared through “Data Debits” analogous to 
the way individuals use their bank accounts, as a scaffolding strategy to assist in the 
understanding of the HAT. Coordinating mechanisms were implemented by 
communicating to firms how firms themselves could give their customers HATs by 
offering their existing customers base a ‘private data account’, complete with the 
firm’s labelling and branding, “powered by the HAT”, thus enabling decentralisation 
of personal data storage and exchange without third party services and the firm 
could retain ownership of the relationship with their own customers, while being 
able to obtain data signals. Following the prescribed microeconomic design, 
HATDeX created data plug services to generate non-rivalrous copies of OPD in the 
HAT, therefore enabling individuals to claim their own data from other sources on 
the Internet in real time. As of 20 April, 2018, HAT owners have PPD of real-time 
data from Spotify music listens, Google Calendar, Facebook and Twitter posts and 
Fitbit activities.  Operationalising the design further, the control and processing of 
personal data are done within the HAT, enabling HAT owners to act as “data 
controllers” and processors of the data in their HATs. In the implementation, a 
decision was also taken to reduce the risks of lock-in by releasing the HAT open 
source code to ensure the transparency of data handling within HATs. HAT 
providers do not have any access to HAT data except through data debits for the 
data they wish to acquire. PPD Signals such as verified action (action verified by 
data coming into the HAT) was the first signals to appear and be shared. 
 
The design of the legal, technological and economic system as set out above was 
implemented in January 2017 in beta and in full roll-out in November 2017. As of 
20 April 2018, a total of 1104 HAT owners have signed up, with a 4.3% weekly 
growth. HATDeX reported 12 organisations negotiating deployments and 27 
business leads in various stages of meetings. Firms that came forward were keen to 
leverage the value of personal data to improve their strategic advantage – they 
wanted to deliver engaging, high-value apps and services to their customers, but 
found it a challenge to do so. 
 
 
Market Disruption 
 
The disruptive effects of the implementation were recognised through reports in 
the Financial Times, Wired Magazine, Spectator and various news media3. The HAT 
has been mentioned at governmental levels, from an Australian government report 
on data collection and use, to the UK Lords Select committee on AI. The HAT’s 
disruptive potential was seen as the start of a digital consumer economy about to 
decentralise. Firms that came forward to adopt the technology did so for various 
reasons. 
 
 
                                               
3 https://www.hatcommunity.org/our-voice  
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Figure 5: Firms’ motivation for adopting HAT technol 
 
 
The findings indicate their motivations (See Figure 5), of which there were 14 in 
total: (1) the HAT enabled firms to create a direct relationship with their own 
customers and their data so that firms can provide insights (customer insights); (2) 
being able to profile algorithmically without privacy risks was an advantage 
(financial profiling); (3) since holding personal data is costly, new apps benefit from 
not having to build user account management by building their services on the 
HAT, as they can be assured of data access on demand, as long as the data contract 
is valid (capability); (4) the ability to personalise their offering around personal data 
was valued (personalisation); (5) they sought to provide their own clients (B2B) the 
ability to profile end customers (customer profiling); (6) they sought to run market 
research and experiments with real behavioural data (experiment management); 
(7) being able to share user base with a family of apps (network effect, HAT 
owners); (8) being able to broker customers data for revenues (revenue); (9) the 
ability to install private analytics and machine learning algorithms to generate 
signals for recommendations; (10) benefiting from the partners on the platform 
(network effect, partners); (11) bragging rights to being consumer champions of 
privacy; (12) mitigating personal data privacy risks; (13) the opportunity to request 
for more data than they can otherwise collect (more data); and (14) the 
opportunity to authenticate and verify actions such as listening to certain types of 
music, buying from certain shops etc.  
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Figure 6: Growth of HATs before scaling 
 
 
Consumers who downloaded retail HATs did so for four reasons: (1) control over 
their data; (2) being able to store and track their data; (3) wanting to monetise their 
own data; and (4) being evangelists for personal data empowerment.  
 
In May 2018, HATDeX announced the creation of the HAT infrastructure Platform in 
collaboration with Tolga Uzuner, a global technology investor and former Partner at 
Apollo Global Management LLC with a £30 million planned commitment to create 
at least 10 million new HAT micro-servers, provisioning HAT micro-servers, growing 
technology infrastructure, and improving innovation in the decentralised data 
economy through 2020. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
While it is too early to judge if indeed the market for the new PPD asset is 
sustainable, research is ongoing in this space and the scaling-up of HATs in the 
coming months will provide empirical evidence on the type of PPD and PPD signals 
that would be in demand. 
 
Proposition 2 is largely proven as HAT has now taken on multiple datasets partly 
from data plugs and partly from new data generated by HAT owners themselves 
through apps. Higher signal quality is evident through the ‘verified action’ signal 
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where HAT owners can accept offers to tweet, post or listen to music and the data 
generated from the digital action of actually tweeting and posting on social media 
allows the HAT to verify that the action was undertaken and send out the signal if 
the HAT owner accepts the signal exchange from an app. Pareto efficiency is yet 
unproven. As HAT scales to 10 million in the next two years, this may be 
measurable. PPD Matching while yet to be evidenced, and is partially validated by 
the companies in the process of integrating with HATs for the purpose of buying 
signals while mitigating privacy risks. Source excludability is legally untested, 
although unofficial conversations with lawyers and government suggest that HAT 
data is unencumbered. The findings showed that the choice of coordination 
structures clearly made a difference in attracting firms. That HATDeX technology 
was infrastructural and created integration mechanisms not merely at the 
technological, but also at the business and experience levels, showed that 
transactions designed were able to scaffold into the existing markets and evolve 
them into new ones. Seeing one app’s data in another app, even if it is the person’s 
HAT dashboard app, is the most mind-bending realisation for many firms and 
individuals. Reusing and resharing for PPD network effect value is seen to be most 
disruptive and the findings suggest that this polarised the firms. Some firms used 
HATs exclusively for their apps, not bothering to create user accounts at all and are 
willing to share with others, while others valued having personal data both on their 
apps and in HATs, suffering some discomfort of ‘letting their data go’ despite the 
law in Europe mandating that individuals have rights to access their own data. 
Having consumers with PPD accessible real time and on demand has created alarm 
bells for many firms, as the fear that consumer control means a loss of market 
advantage, since their data could be given to others. Other firms this viewed 
positively as they saw their app data being used by other apps as the potential to 
create lock-in effects. In terms of matching and creating a market for PPD, serving 
internal markets of firms and their existing customers helped to create a safe 
environment for transacting PPD, and using the firm’s existing revenue models 
reduced congestion. It also made matching easier, as signals were aligned to what 
both firms and their customers wanted within one app. By targeting firms with 
existing customers, internal markets enabled PPD to achieve thickness with lower 
effort. 
 
Economics of Personal Data. Personal data is a production asset to create greater 
product variety at low marginal costs. Potentially, this could be treated the way all 
production assets are treated - as resources for the production of goods such as 
land, labour, capital (Samuelson and Nordhaus 2004). In an age of Internet-
Connected Objects (ICO) where data is generated from a doorbell ringing, water 
consumption from a shower, the Kindle page on which the reader has stopped 
reading; zetabytes of bitstring data is being generated with or without an 
individual’s direct involvement, whether it is useful or not. The issue of whether 
bitstring data as a production asset should derive its income from rent (bitstring 
data coming from land) or interest (bitstring data from capital goods) or wages 
(bitstring data from human labour) becomes a relevant discussion. If typing into a 
search box is digital labour, then search results can be deemed as ‘wages’. The 
current situation is that all bitstring data belongs to the capital asset that generates 
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it, regardless of the creator of the data. This means that the data generated by a 
tractor would belong to the manufacturer – rather than the owner  of that tractor, 
since the current rules on bitstring data generation and rights do not differentiate 
between bitstring data as an asset, or the asset itself. The concepts, theories and 
fundamentals of personal data as an asset needs a robust economic discussion. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The technological, legal and economic architecture of a containerised private 
database with microservices - a personal micro-server - has a few advantages. 
Through the microservices, individuals can exchange the personal data within their 
database for their own benefit, deriving income from it or transferring it for fun or 
service if they wish. The containerised microservices help individuals do this, using 
standard APIs, with the individuals themselves staying in full control. The individual 
can become an effective on-demand data supplier to firms building services that 
require personal data. Personal data form entry, personalised quotations, 
assessments, online identity verification, and user account creation all carry risks 
and costs for the corporation. An alternative that allows for the sharing of personal 
data, by individuals themselves, from their own personal micro-servers can save 
both businesses and individuals time, effort, risk, expense and liability. Widely 
adopted, the number of personal micro-servers could greatly reduce the incentives 
for cyber-attacks. A penetration into one secure database container yields the 
perpetrator of that attack exactly one database, where in the current system a 
similar risk would yield up to billions of records of personal data instead. 
 
This paper theorised the fundamental economic properties of personal data to 
argue the challenges and vulnerabilities faced by organisation-controlled personal 
data. It then set out a series of propositions for market redesign to enable a more 
efficient technological, legal and economic model through the creation of PPD, and 
argued for its usage especially in AI, health and wellbeing. With the HAT micro-
server and PPD, privacy is no longer an issue. This paper proposes that economic 
risks would be lowered with PPD and personal data signals can proliferate, creating 
new services using personal data and signals in real time and on demand. 
Individuals can share their signals for 5 minutes or 50 days and with more access to 
data from the European General Data Protection Regulation, more datasets can 
come into individual HATs for privacy-preserving tools and algorithms to flourish, 
generating even more signals and better signal quality. The HAT also takes AI to the 
next level - Aug-I - Augmented Intelligence - enabling a combination of personal 
data, machines and algorithms to work together to improve human decision, action 
and societal coordination - all in real time, with low privacy risks. Since the data is 
transacted with the individual and not a third-party broker, and the signals 
generated can create recommendations and personalisations that are relevant, the 
person becomes a stakeholder in the quality of the data, and remains in control of 
what is shared. Since data is available in real time and on demand, with low 
marginal costs, we propose that more signal buyers can emerge from new apps 
created. And since HATs are always on, data scarcity is reduced and smaller players 
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with low data science capabilities can come into the market to create apps. This 
means also that hoarding of personal data can reduce, creating a more secure 
world. With always-on API access, signals can also be matched with 
recommendations and personalisations before they perish. Finally, since the HAT 
owner owns the micro-server and therefore the rights of the data within, there are 
no data source constraints and the HAT owner benefits from a historical account of 
his digital life that could be shared for better societal health and wellbeing. As the 
HAT platform scales, further research aims to obtain an empirical understanding of 
PPD exchanges and how the market evolves, especially for data signals. This would 
enable an understanding of the value of PPD to HAT owners, organisations  and 
indeed, society, to the level of data granularity that has never been possible. 
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